The West Philippine Sea: Territorial and Maritime Disputes from a Filipino Perspective

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Authors: 

Aileen S.P. Baviera and Jay Batongbacal

 

About: 

THE PRIMER is an initiative of independent researchers. The facts and analyses presented herein represent the authors’ own appreciation of published material and primary sources that were accessible to them during the course of the research. They do not represent any position of the government of the Republic of the Philippines, unless stated otherwise, nor of the publisher. The purpose of this Primer is to make available in a single updated volume a simplified and objective rendering of the historical background, current conditions, pertinent issues and policy questions regarding the territorial and maritime disputes in the West Philippine Sea. It is intended to assist students, researchers, media practitioners, non-specialist members of the civil service, as well as the general public, in deepening their understanding of the many different issues of the West Philippine Sea disputes. The questions and answers are framed from a Filipino perspective that focuses on information that the authors considered to be most important and of interest to citizens of this country, rather than information that may be highlighted by various foreign authors, organizations or governments. The contents are not intended as advocacy of any particular position or policy recommendation. As proposed by some stakeholders, this updated version includes more recent developments pertaining to Ayungin Shoal, and the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) arbitration process initiated by the Philippines with respect to China's 9-dash line claim.

THE PHILIPPINES IN CHINA'S SOFT POWER STRATEGY

ISEAS Perspective #36, 2013

The Philippines in China’s Soft Power Strategy

By Aileen San Pablo-Baviera (Guest Writer)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:

• China has expressly recognized the value of soft power as an instrument of diplomacy. The Philippines, because of its maritime disputes with China and its close security ties with the United States, is an interesting case for studying the efficacy of Chinese soft power.

• While awareness of Chinese culture and appreciation of its consumer products

have grown in the Philippines, there are hindrances (language gap, perceptions

of shoddy product quality, competing cultural influences, etc.) remaining that prevent these from translating into useful soft power.

• Chinese and Filipinos have widely divergent political values despite shared aspirations and common problems. China’s authoritarian political model does not offer great attraction for Filipinos in light of the Philippines’ own experiences.

• China’s approaches to development can provide many positive as well as a few

negative lessons for the Philippines as the latter strives to achieve similar progress and prosperity.

• China is likely to emerge as a major investor, creditor and source of development

assistance for the Philippines, but development cooperation needs to be consistent with certain partnership norms and governance principles already in place in

the Philippines.

• Soft power is welcome, but in light of heightening territorial tensions, Filipinos

are likely to feel more reassured if China commits instead to using its hard power

less in the future.

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ON CHINA'S STREAMLINING OF MARITIME FORCES

http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/article/1189430/upside-and-downside-seen-beijings-move

Upside and downside seen in Beijing's move on Scarborough Shoal Wednesday, 13 March, 2013 [UPDATED: 07:31]

Raissa Robles in Manila

A sensible move to lower risks or a sharp new tool to assert sovereignty - analysts in the Philippines are hoping for the former but fear the latter as they digest China's consolidation of its maritime agencies under one civilian command to patrol its disputed borders.

The Philippine government - locked in a bitter territorial dispute with China over the Scarborough Shoal - has yet to comment officially on China's move to place its rapidly expanding coastguard-style forces under one roof, but analysts have noted both positives and negatives.

COMMENT ON THE PHILIPPINE DECISION
TO BRING S.C.S. TO ARBITRATION UNDER UNCLOS

On January 22, the Philippine government initiated arbitral proceedings against China under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (Art 287 and Annex VII) "to clearly establish the sovereign rights and jurisdiction of the Philippines over its maritime entitlements in the West Philippine Sea". The act was said to be "in furtherance of friendly relations with China" and the "obligation...to seek a peaceful and durable resolution of the dispute..."

I believe the move shows the sincerity of the Philippines' desire to find a peaceful and just solution to at least some aspects of the disputes so that both countries can try to move forward and focus on more constructive (e.g. economic, business, people to people) aspects of their relations. Judging by the sharp deterioration in ties of the last 2-3 years and peering into a very uncertain future, there is very little possibility for successful bilateral negotiations as China has all along preferred. For both countries, apparently irreconcilable positions, complex domestic political considerations, and trends in the geopolitical and security environment have made it difficult to demonstrate the good will needed for negotiations to succeed; third party arbitration and what we expect shall be a neutral and objective appraisal of the arguments and evidence at least offer a ray of hope. I hope China and other countries will see the Philippine move in this light.

If this move prospers, at the end of what may be a long process, the outcome may not be the solution that both parties want, but we only need an outcome both can respect. Both countries after all want peace and stability as a requisite to their continued development. The Chinese and the Filipino people have lived peacefully as neighbors for millenia, and the current leadership of both states have the responsibility to ensure it stays that way.

For text of the DFA statement, see:
http://www.scribd.com/doc/121606570/DFA-press-release-on-arbitral-proceedings-on-Spratlys-Bajo-de-Masinloc

For text of Philippine notification, see: 
http://xa.yimg.com/kq/groups/10435359/1872270639/name/Notification

TOWARDS A STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK FOR MANAGEMENT OF THE WEST PHILIPPINE SEA

A White Paper by the WPS Informal Expert Group

SUMMARY AND HIGHLIGHTS

Introduction

Tensions among rival claimant-states to the waters and land features of the South China Sea (SCS) – particularly China, the Philippines and Vietnam - have escalated significantly in the last several years, bringing the Philippines to center stage as a key participant in the future of security and stability in our part of the world. While the surge in confrontational rhetoric and actions directed against the Philippines have added to the urgency of ensuring calibrated and effective responses, the territorial and resource disputes themselves are not new and have been the subject of policy action and deliberation for decades. The challenges arising therefrom are not expected to be resolved easily or soon, but will likely continue to demand the attention of government and the Filipino public for decades to come.

This White Paper seeks to draw the attention of all concerned Filipino stakeholders – particularly those in government - to the urgent need for a strategic framework for the management of our territorial, maritime jurisdiction, and resource disputes in the West Philippine Sea (WPS). The authors are former or current public servants, coming from various areas of specialization, who have long been involved in past initiatives relating to Philippine policy in the WPS.

The paper is not intended to provide answers to all the policy questions, but to suggest a policy agenda, and to underscore the urgent need for a strategic vision, more permanent institutions, as well as for more effective arrangements for policymaking and coordination to address such agenda. 

INTERVIEW ON RAPPLER

CHINA SEES PH. AS U.S. 'PROXY' says expert

BY CARLOS SANTAMARIA

Posted on 07/29/2012 2:15 PM  | Updated 08/01/2012 9:35 AM

MANILA, Philippines - In the dispute over Scarborough Shoal, China is "overreacting" because Beijing still sees the Philippines as a US proxy, a foreign policy expert told Rappler.

"The Philippines, in the overall scheme of things, is not important enough for China to worry about. China is overreacting to everything because they see us as a US ally," said Aileen Baviera, professor of Asian Studies at the University of the Philippines.

"We have a problem with China, but China's problem is with the United States," Baviera added. " Whatever we say, China looks at us as a US proxy."

US defense assistance but no more troops

So, what should the Philippines do to manage this relationship?

"http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/07/26/south-china-sea-disputes-why-asean-must-unite/)

South China Sea disputes: why ASEAN must unite
July 26th, 2012
Author: Aileen S. P. Baviera, University of the Philippines

After teetering on the edge all through the month, the ASEAN Humpty Dumpty abruptly fell off its wall on 13 July and broke into pieces. The grouping failed to issue a joint communiqué following the meeting in Phnom Penh due to differences on how to reflect discussions on the South China Sea disputes.

Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa had to fly to ASEAN capitals to try to put Humpty together again by issuing a ‘common position’. However, not only Indonesia but everyone in ASEAN — as well as China and the US — (and all the king’s horses and all the king’s men) would do well to come and help seal the cracks.

For the last 45 years ASEAN has issued a joint communiqué at the end of each of its meetings. There has always been bilateral friction between member states, but this friction is normally smoothed over in meetings. Member states generally agree that ASEAN is more than the sum of its parts, and the joint statement at the end of each meeting reaffirms that the organisation is more important than any single member. Even if it reflects only the lowest common denominator, the communiqué is still a symbolic affirmation of shared strategic interests.

So there is more at stake in recent events than the statement itself. A few sentences acknowledging the recent tensions between Vietnam and the Philippines and China could have sufficed. Thus it is confounding that the chair, Cambodia, was unable to forge even a minimalist consensus, though some speculate that there were promises made to a certain non-member of the ASEAN family — China.

Putting the ASEAN Humpty Dumpty back together again

http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/266302/opinion/putting-the-asean-humpty-dumpty-back-together-again

BY AILEEN S.P. BAVIERA July 22, 2012 10:23am

Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa has not been flying to ASEAN capitals just to try to put together a statement, or the joint communique that should have been issued at the end of the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Phnom Penh earlier this month. He is trying to put the ASEAN Humpty Dumpty back together again. And everyone – not least the Philippines, Vietnam, ASEAN chair Cambodia, and all other member countries, but even China, the United States, ASEAN’s other dialogue partners, and all the king’s horses and all the king’s men, would do well to come with their glue and adhesives and participate in this effort.
At stake is much more than the few sentences that would reflect that ASEAN did discuss and come to agreement on the recent tensions between members states Vietnam and the Philippines on one hand, and the group’s dialogue partner China on the other. Although certainly, one is confounded that the chair could not muster the wisdom and perseverance to forge even a minimalist consensus, perhaps – goes the speculation - because of promises made to a non-member of the ASEAN family.