INTERVIEW ON RAPPLER

CHINA SEES PH. AS U.S. 'PROXY' says expert

BY CARLOS SANTAMARIA

Posted on 07/29/2012 2:15 PM  | Updated 08/01/2012 9:35 AM

MANILA, Philippines - In the dispute over Scarborough Shoal, China is "overreacting" because Beijing still sees the Philippines as a US proxy, a foreign policy expert told Rappler.

"The Philippines, in the overall scheme of things, is not important enough for China to worry about. China is overreacting to everything because they see us as a US ally," said Aileen Baviera, professor of Asian Studies at the University of the Philippines.

"We have a problem with China, but China's problem is with the United States," Baviera added. " Whatever we say, China looks at us as a US proxy."

US defense assistance but no more troops

So, what should the Philippines do to manage this relationship?

"http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/07/26/south-china-sea-disputes-why-asean-must-unite/)

South China Sea disputes: why ASEAN must unite
July 26th, 2012
Author: Aileen S. P. Baviera, University of the Philippines

After teetering on the edge all through the month, the ASEAN Humpty Dumpty abruptly fell off its wall on 13 July and broke into pieces. The grouping failed to issue a joint communiqué following the meeting in Phnom Penh due to differences on how to reflect discussions on the South China Sea disputes.

Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa had to fly to ASEAN capitals to try to put Humpty together again by issuing a ‘common position’. However, not only Indonesia but everyone in ASEAN — as well as China and the US — (and all the king’s horses and all the king’s men) would do well to come and help seal the cracks.

For the last 45 years ASEAN has issued a joint communiqué at the end of each of its meetings. There has always been bilateral friction between member states, but this friction is normally smoothed over in meetings. Member states generally agree that ASEAN is more than the sum of its parts, and the joint statement at the end of each meeting reaffirms that the organisation is more important than any single member. Even if it reflects only the lowest common denominator, the communiqué is still a symbolic affirmation of shared strategic interests.

So there is more at stake in recent events than the statement itself. A few sentences acknowledging the recent tensions between Vietnam and the Philippines and China could have sufficed. Thus it is confounding that the chair, Cambodia, was unable to forge even a minimalist consensus, though some speculate that there were promises made to a certain non-member of the ASEAN family — China.

Putting the ASEAN Humpty Dumpty back together again

http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/266302/opinion/putting-the-asean-humpty-dumpty-back-together-again

BY AILEEN S.P. BAVIERA July 22, 2012 10:23am

Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa has not been flying to ASEAN capitals just to try to put together a statement, or the joint communique that should have been issued at the end of the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Phnom Penh earlier this month. He is trying to put the ASEAN Humpty Dumpty back together again. And everyone – not least the Philippines, Vietnam, ASEAN chair Cambodia, and all other member countries, but even China, the United States, ASEAN’s other dialogue partners, and all the king’s horses and all the king’s men, would do well to come with their glue and adhesives and participate in this effort.
At stake is much more than the few sentences that would reflect that ASEAN did discuss and come to agreement on the recent tensions between members states Vietnam and the Philippines on one hand, and the group’s dialogue partner China on the other. Although certainly, one is confounded that the chair could not muster the wisdom and perseverance to forge even a minimalist consensus, perhaps – goes the speculation - because of promises made to a non-member of the ASEAN family.

NEW RESOURCE ON PHILIPPINE FOREIGN RELATIONS

Forging a New Philippine Foreign Policy is a new website launched last February 21, 2012 by the Asian Center, University of the Philippines. We conceptualized the website mainly with the hope of stimulating more dynamic discourses on the present and future directions of the country's international relations, and building ever-expanding constituencies for related analysis and advocacy. The site also serves as a resource databank for users and registered members, who may access news, documents, and research papers, among others. Visitors to my blog will likely find this new resource useful as well. The URL is http://philippinesintheworld.org.

THE SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTES: 
IS THE AQUINO WAY THE "ASEAN WAY”?

http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/Perspective/RSIS0042012.pdf

_________________________________________________________________________________
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, NTU
RSIS Commentaries No. 004/2012 dated 5 January 2012

   
Synopsis
Growing Chinese assertiveness and military  capability have led the Aquino government to adopt tougher rhetoric towards China over the South China Sea disputes. Will the Aquino way bring more results than the “ASEAN Way”?
                                                               
Commentary
THE AQUINO government’s tougher posture towards China with regard to the South China Sea disputes is changing the atmospherics of this long-standing regional security issue. While this shift has presented a new approach to tackling the regional tensions,  observers are watching whether the “Aquino way” will bring more results than the “ASEAN Way” of non-confrontation. Not all ASEAN members are, however, comfortable with the Aquino approach.
 
Manila’s core interest

The Philippines, an archipelago entirely surrounded by water, pursues certain core interests in its territorial claims in the South China Sea just like other claimant countries. These include promoting respect for its territorial integrity and sovereignty, security against external threats, access to ocean resources to serve development needs, and maintaining good order at sea. Manila has demonstrated sovereignty over its claimed Kalayaan Islands through continuous occupation of certain features, prevention of illegal entry or illegal fishing, legislation of baselines, and other measures. In seeking peaceful and norms-based approaches to the disputes, it initiated ASEAN’s 1992 Manila Declaration on the South China Sea, which called on claimants to exercise self-restraint and settle disputes peacefully.

PHILIPPINE INTERESTS AND POSITIONS ON THE SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTES

Remarks at a Forum on the South China Sea

Organized by the Carlos P. Romulo Foundation and 

Institute for Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore

17 October 2011, Manila Polo Club

On this occasion, I wish to focus my remarks not on the legal and technical dimensions of the Philippine claims on the South China Sea, about which there has been much discussion already and for which there are far more capable legal scholars and experts. I will instead focus on what I understand to be Philippine interests in the South China Sea, drawing from my background in the study of politics and international relations; and exploring specifically how the territorial disputes and the maritime jurisdiction questions relate with broader issues such as the future of Chinese power, Sino-American rivalry for influence over East Asia, and the value and efficacy of an ASEAN-centered regional approach to the problems. 

I wish to briefly address three points, based on my continuous observation and research on the subject:

1.     What are the Philippines’ “core interests” in the South China Sea?

2.     What has historically been the Philippine approach to the territorial and maritime jurisdiction disputes?

3.     What are the elements of the emerging Philippine policy toward the South China Sea under the Aquino government, and how do they reflect Philippine interests in the evolving regional context?

AQUINO POLICY ON THE SOUTH CHINA SEA: ARE WE READY FOR TOUGH TIMES AHEAD?

The Philippine Star, October 24, 2011, p. 25

By Aileen San Pablo-Baviera

The territorial disputes and maritime jurisdiction issues in the South China Sea will be a continuing bone of contention between the Philippines and its neighbors, especially China which is the most powerful and determined among them, for many years to come.

Since the 1990s, the Philippines has been pro-active in seeking cooperative, rules-based approaches to managing the disputes, relying on both bilateral as well as multilateral diplomacy. Bilaterally, the Philippines entered into agreements with China and Vietnam in 1995 and 1997 pledging self-restraint and urging cooperation on non-sensitive areas. Many high-level exchanges were held, including among military officials. Even at the height of tensions over Mischief Reef, bilateral trade and people-to-people ties between Beijing and Manila thrived.

Multilaterally, the Philippines also spearheaded the 1992 Manila Declaration by ASEAN states, the negotiation of an ASEAN-China code of conduct (COC) which resulted in the 2002 Declaration of Conduct (DOC), and even the ill-fated Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking (JMSU) with China and Vietnam which was allowed to lapse after being implicated in alleged corrupt and treasonous activities of the previous regime.

CAN AND WILL REGIONAL ARCHITECTURE PRODUCE NORMS TO HELP RESOLVE DISPUTES AMONG MEMBER STATES?

Based on Remarks at the Asia Foundation’s Asia Perspectives Program on

“The Evolving Nature of Asia’s Regional Architecture: Views from ASEAN”, 8 November 2011, 9:00-11:00 a.m., Washington, D.C.

[The views expressed are the author's own and do not represent those of the sponsoring organization]

CAN AND WILL REGIONAL ARCHITECTURE PRODUCE NORMS TO HELP RESOLVE DISPUTES AMONG MEMBER STATES? 

Aileen S.P. Baviera

I assume ‘regional architecture’ here to mean the multiple multilateral cooperation arrangements, using the definition by Nick Bisley in 2007: “a reasonably coherent network of regional organizations, institutions, bilateral and multilateral arrangements, dialogue forums, and other relevant mechanisms that work collectively for regional prosperity, peace, and stability.” In east Asia and the Pacific, some of these are projects involving the building of a regional “community”, ideally one based on a shared identity and a “we-feeling”. ASEAN is clearly moving in that direction, and for ASEAN Plus 3 or APT, a similar aspiration had been expressed in the original vision document prepared by the East Asia Vision Group. Geographic contiguity, shared history and economic interdependence play a big role in infusing ASEAN and APT with a sense of a shared destiny.