US, Japan, ASEAN and Maritime Security in Southeast Asia

US, Japan, ASEAN and Maritime Security in Southeast Asia

Aileen S.P. Baviera, University of the Philippines

Presented at a Workshop organized by the East-West Center in Washington, Japan Institute of International Affairs, Institute for Southeast Asian Studies, and the Sasakawa Peace Foundation,

12-13 June 2014, ISEAS Singapore

Introduction

Security challenges in Southeast Asia are diverse, comprising both traditional security (e.g. inter-state territorial disputes and intra-state armed conflicts) and nontraditional security (e.g. pandemics, climate change), state security as well as human security. This paper recognizes this but concentrates on a very important arena where recent developments have sharply aggravated concerns over security – i.e. the maritime security environment.

Maritime security in Southeast Asia itself covers at least four interconnected layers of security challenges, having different set of stakeholders and interests.  These include: (1.) territorial sovereignty disputes over islands and other features in Southeast Asian seas; (2.) disputes over maritime rights and jurisdictions (e.g. access to fish, energy and mineral resources, regulation of other activities at sea) arising from unclear and overlapping boundaries and in part from territorial disputes;  (3.) increasing geopolitical competition among major powers, attendant to perceptions of power shift;  (4.) nontraditional security challenges common to many states (e.g. threats to safety of life at sea, piracy, effects of natural disasters and of climate change)

The complexity of maritime security in Southeast Asia requires various levels and dimensions of cooperation and competition, implying complexity of possible roles of the US, Japan, ASEAN and other actors, separately and collectively, in addressing such challenges. 

IMPLICATIONS OF PHILIPPINES-US ENHANCED DEFENSE COOPERATION AGREEMENT

http://www.eastwestcenter.org/publications/implications-the-us-philippines-enhanced-defense-cooperation-agreement

BY AILEEN S.P. BAVIERA
East-West Center Asia-Pacific Bulletin

President Barack Obama’s visit to the Philippines, the last leg of his recent four-nation Asian tour, produced a new bilateral defense agreement that was touted by some observers as the single most significant outcome of his regional foray. The agreement was said to contribute to his goals of reassuring allies and signaling that the United States is serious about its “rebalance” to Asia. How does the signing of the 10-year Philippines-US Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) help promote overall security relations between the United States and the Philippines and how might the agreement impact ongoing efforts to manage the territorial and maritime disputes in the South China Sea?

When the Philippine government of Corazon Aquino voted in 1991 to close Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Base—major American military facilities in Southeast Asia—at the end of the Cold War, the strategic importance of the alliance to both parties declined. Notwithstanding cordial relations with China in the past and active multilateral diplomacy with ASEAN, Philippine governments since the 1980s have sought to persuade the United States to include Manila’s territorial claims in the South China Sea in the scope of their mutual defense obligations. Absent such guarantees, many Filipinos believe the US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) to be one-sided, committing Philippine support for US strategic objectives while failing to secure US support for the one external defense issue that truly matters to Manila.

Growing Strategic Rivalry Among East Asia's Great Powers-Implications for Southeast Asia and the South China Sea
     To access the original source, go to http://kyotoreview.org/.

Recent events in the East China Sea and the South China Sea portend that things are bound to get worse before they get better, with respect to the territorial and maritime resource disputes between China and various regional states.

China’s November 23, 2013 declaration of an Air Defense Indentification Zone on the East China Sea, overlapping an area of the Diaoyutai/Senkakus disputed with Japan, has rankled its neighbors, principally Japan and South Korea.  It has pushed these countries as well as the United States and Australia to challenge the new rules Beijing imposed, by flying into the declared ADIZ without reporting their flight plan to China or taking unusual steps to identify themselves. In China’s defense, Chinese sources argue that countries have the right to declare ADIZ – as Japan itself declared one in the same area over forty years ago and that the US and about twenty other countries have several such zones that other states respect — and that moreover the move was defensive and in response to Japanese politicians’  threat to shoot down Chinese drones flying over Japanese airspace.

Domestic Interests and Foreign Policy in China and the Philippines: Implications for the South China Sea Dispute

 
Philippine Studies: Historical and Ethnographic Viewpoints (PSHEV), volume 62, issue no. 1, March 2014;  

To take you there, click: http://www.philippinestudies.net/ojs/index.php/ps/article/view/4103

From the Editor's Introduction

In a professorial address, Aileen S. P. Baviera juxtaposes the perspectives of China and the Philippines on the territorial and maritime resource disputes in the South China Sea, which the Philippines calls West Philippine Sea. Presenting the two views side by side in a sort of political dictionary, Baviera posits commensurability and engages in an act of translation that may help bridge the chasm between the two states. 

Filomeno V. Aguilar Jr.
Ateneo de Manila University 

This professorial address argues the need for a greater understanding of how domestic politics influences the foreign policies of the Philippines and China in general and their foreign policies toward each other in particular, specifically on the issue of the South China Sea territorial and maritime resource disputes. The paper juxtaposes the differing views of these disputes from the perspectives of both China and the Philippines, which result in puzzles on both sides. The aim is to improve the management of relations between the two countries.

Keywords: South China Sea disputes • nationalism • power asymmetry • perceptions • culture

Building the ASEAN-China strategic partnership: the maritime dimension

This article is prepared for the ASEAN Newsletter (September 2013 issue) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Republic of Korea.

The commemoration of the 10^th anniversary of the ASEAN-China strategic partnership this year will be met by greater skepticism than at its launching in 2003. Recent developments in the East Asian region point to still huge mistrust between the two sides, particularly between China and the ASEAN states that are embroiled in territorial and maritime disputes with China in the South China Sea. Of late, security tensions have been compounded by escalating geopolitical rivalry between China and the region’s other big powers -- the United States and Japan, both also vital partners of ASEAN.

That said, healthy skepticism underscores the challenges but does not belittle the importance of this relationship between East Asia’s now preeminent economic and rising military power on the one hand, and its most successful regionalist collective and key catalyst of multilateral dialogue and cooperation on the other hand. It may be argued that ASEAN-China cooperation is bound to have even greater impact in the near future, not only on their current shared bilateral interests such as free trade, economic cooperation and infrastructure connectivity, but also on matters beyond their own geographic reach. Much, however, depends on each side’s vision of its own regional role.

The Philippines and the ASEAN Political-Security Community

Aileen S.P. Baviera, Asian Center, University of the Philippines

12 May 2013

Among the goals set by ASEAN for the year 2015 is to build the foundations for the ten Southeast Asian states to evolve into a cohesive political-security community. Compared with the two other "pillars" of the ASEAN community - the ASEAN economic community and the ASEAN sociocultural community - this goal may be the most difficult to attain. The Philippines has played and should continue to play an important role in bringing the vision of a truly cohesive and progressive ASEAN community into fruition. But the road ahead - especially towards an ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC) - is full of potholes and obstacles, some of which may challenge the Philippines to define more precisely the interests, values and principles that it stands for.

Democracy, Human Rights and the Rule of Law

The APSC Blueprint and its Plan of Action call for member states to "ensure that countries in the region live at peace with one another and with the world in a just, democratic and harmonious environment". Moving together towards this objective entails "respect for democracy, the rule of law and good governance, respect for and promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms". The establishment of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) in 2009 was a modest but important step in this direction, and is something that both the Philippine government and non-government organizations worked hard and can proudly take some credit for.

The West Philippine Sea: Territorial and Maritime Disputes from a Filipino Perspective

View full text and illustrations here

Authors: 

Aileen S.P. Baviera and Jay Batongbacal

 

About: 

THE PRIMER is an initiative of independent researchers. The facts and analyses presented herein represent the authors’ own appreciation of published material and primary sources that were accessible to them during the course of the research. They do not represent any position of the government of the Republic of the Philippines, unless stated otherwise, nor of the publisher. The purpose of this Primer is to make available in a single updated volume a simplified and objective rendering of the historical background, current conditions, pertinent issues and policy questions regarding the territorial and maritime disputes in the West Philippine Sea. It is intended to assist students, researchers, media practitioners, non-specialist members of the civil service, as well as the general public, in deepening their understanding of the many different issues of the West Philippine Sea disputes. The questions and answers are framed from a Filipino perspective that focuses on information that the authors considered to be most important and of interest to citizens of this country, rather than information that may be highlighted by various foreign authors, organizations or governments. The contents are not intended as advocacy of any particular position or policy recommendation. As proposed by some stakeholders, this updated version includes more recent developments pertaining to Ayungin Shoal, and the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) arbitration process initiated by the Philippines with respect to China's 9-dash line claim.

THE PHILIPPINES IN CHINA'S SOFT POWER STRATEGY

ISEAS Perspective #36, 2013

The Philippines in China’s Soft Power Strategy

By Aileen San Pablo-Baviera (Guest Writer)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:

• China has expressly recognized the value of soft power as an instrument of diplomacy. The Philippines, because of its maritime disputes with China and its close security ties with the United States, is an interesting case for studying the efficacy of Chinese soft power.

• While awareness of Chinese culture and appreciation of its consumer products

have grown in the Philippines, there are hindrances (language gap, perceptions

of shoddy product quality, competing cultural influences, etc.) remaining that prevent these from translating into useful soft power.

• Chinese and Filipinos have widely divergent political values despite shared aspirations and common problems. China’s authoritarian political model does not offer great attraction for Filipinos in light of the Philippines’ own experiences.

• China’s approaches to development can provide many positive as well as a few

negative lessons for the Philippines as the latter strives to achieve similar progress and prosperity.

• China is likely to emerge as a major investor, creditor and source of development

assistance for the Philippines, but development cooperation needs to be consistent with certain partnership norms and governance principles already in place in

the Philippines.

• Soft power is welcome, but in light of heightening territorial tensions, Filipinos

are likely to feel more reassured if China commits instead to using its hard power

less in the future.

----------------------------

READ FULL TEXT

ON CHINA'S STREAMLINING OF MARITIME FORCES

http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/article/1189430/upside-and-downside-seen-beijings-move

Upside and downside seen in Beijing's move on Scarborough Shoal Wednesday, 13 March, 2013 [UPDATED: 07:31]

Raissa Robles in Manila

A sensible move to lower risks or a sharp new tool to assert sovereignty - analysts in the Philippines are hoping for the former but fear the latter as they digest China's consolidation of its maritime agencies under one civilian command to patrol its disputed borders.

The Philippine government - locked in a bitter territorial dispute with China over the Scarborough Shoal - has yet to comment officially on China's move to place its rapidly expanding coastguard-style forces under one roof, but analysts have noted both positives and negatives.

COMMENT ON THE PHILIPPINE DECISION
TO BRING S.C.S. TO ARBITRATION UNDER UNCLOS

On January 22, the Philippine government initiated arbitral proceedings against China under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (Art 287 and Annex VII) "to clearly establish the sovereign rights and jurisdiction of the Philippines over its maritime entitlements in the West Philippine Sea". The act was said to be "in furtherance of friendly relations with China" and the "obligation...to seek a peaceful and durable resolution of the dispute..."

I believe the move shows the sincerity of the Philippines' desire to find a peaceful and just solution to at least some aspects of the disputes so that both countries can try to move forward and focus on more constructive (e.g. economic, business, people to people) aspects of their relations. Judging by the sharp deterioration in ties of the last 2-3 years and peering into a very uncertain future, there is very little possibility for successful bilateral negotiations as China has all along preferred. For both countries, apparently irreconcilable positions, complex domestic political considerations, and trends in the geopolitical and security environment have made it difficult to demonstrate the good will needed for negotiations to succeed; third party arbitration and what we expect shall be a neutral and objective appraisal of the arguments and evidence at least offer a ray of hope. I hope China and other countries will see the Philippine move in this light.

If this move prospers, at the end of what may be a long process, the outcome may not be the solution that both parties want, but we only need an outcome both can respect. Both countries after all want peace and stability as a requisite to their continued development. The Chinese and the Filipino people have lived peacefully as neighbors for millenia, and the current leadership of both states have the responsibility to ensure it stays that way.

For text of the DFA statement, see:
http://www.scribd.com/doc/121606570/DFA-press-release-on-arbitral-proceedings-on-Spratlys-Bajo-de-Masinloc

For text of Philippine notification, see: 
http://xa.yimg.com/kq/groups/10435359/1872270639/name/Notification

TOWARDS A STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK FOR MANAGEMENT OF THE WEST PHILIPPINE SEA

A White Paper by the WPS Informal Expert Group

SUMMARY AND HIGHLIGHTS

Introduction

Tensions among rival claimant-states to the waters and land features of the South China Sea (SCS) – particularly China, the Philippines and Vietnam - have escalated significantly in the last several years, bringing the Philippines to center stage as a key participant in the future of security and stability in our part of the world. While the surge in confrontational rhetoric and actions directed against the Philippines have added to the urgency of ensuring calibrated and effective responses, the territorial and resource disputes themselves are not new and have been the subject of policy action and deliberation for decades. The challenges arising therefrom are not expected to be resolved easily or soon, but will likely continue to demand the attention of government and the Filipino public for decades to come.

This White Paper seeks to draw the attention of all concerned Filipino stakeholders – particularly those in government - to the urgent need for a strategic framework for the management of our territorial, maritime jurisdiction, and resource disputes in the West Philippine Sea (WPS). The authors are former or current public servants, coming from various areas of specialization, who have long been involved in past initiatives relating to Philippine policy in the WPS.

The paper is not intended to provide answers to all the policy questions, but to suggest a policy agenda, and to underscore the urgent need for a strategic vision, more permanent institutions, as well as for more effective arrangements for policymaking and coordination to address such agenda. 

INTERVIEW ON RAPPLER

CHINA SEES PH. AS U.S. 'PROXY' says expert

BY CARLOS SANTAMARIA

Posted on 07/29/2012 2:15 PM  | Updated 08/01/2012 9:35 AM

MANILA, Philippines - In the dispute over Scarborough Shoal, China is "overreacting" because Beijing still sees the Philippines as a US proxy, a foreign policy expert told Rappler.

"The Philippines, in the overall scheme of things, is not important enough for China to worry about. China is overreacting to everything because they see us as a US ally," said Aileen Baviera, professor of Asian Studies at the University of the Philippines.

"We have a problem with China, but China's problem is with the United States," Baviera added. " Whatever we say, China looks at us as a US proxy."

US defense assistance but no more troops

So, what should the Philippines do to manage this relationship?

"http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/07/26/south-china-sea-disputes-why-asean-must-unite/)

South China Sea disputes: why ASEAN must unite
July 26th, 2012
Author: Aileen S. P. Baviera, University of the Philippines

After teetering on the edge all through the month, the ASEAN Humpty Dumpty abruptly fell off its wall on 13 July and broke into pieces. The grouping failed to issue a joint communiqué following the meeting in Phnom Penh due to differences on how to reflect discussions on the South China Sea disputes.

Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa had to fly to ASEAN capitals to try to put Humpty together again by issuing a ‘common position’. However, not only Indonesia but everyone in ASEAN — as well as China and the US — (and all the king’s horses and all the king’s men) would do well to come and help seal the cracks.

For the last 45 years ASEAN has issued a joint communiqué at the end of each of its meetings. There has always been bilateral friction between member states, but this friction is normally smoothed over in meetings. Member states generally agree that ASEAN is more than the sum of its parts, and the joint statement at the end of each meeting reaffirms that the organisation is more important than any single member. Even if it reflects only the lowest common denominator, the communiqué is still a symbolic affirmation of shared strategic interests.

So there is more at stake in recent events than the statement itself. A few sentences acknowledging the recent tensions between Vietnam and the Philippines and China could have sufficed. Thus it is confounding that the chair, Cambodia, was unable to forge even a minimalist consensus, though some speculate that there were promises made to a certain non-member of the ASEAN family — China.

Putting the ASEAN Humpty Dumpty back together again

http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/266302/opinion/putting-the-asean-humpty-dumpty-back-together-again

BY AILEEN S.P. BAVIERA July 22, 2012 10:23am

Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa has not been flying to ASEAN capitals just to try to put together a statement, or the joint communique that should have been issued at the end of the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Phnom Penh earlier this month. He is trying to put the ASEAN Humpty Dumpty back together again. And everyone – not least the Philippines, Vietnam, ASEAN chair Cambodia, and all other member countries, but even China, the United States, ASEAN’s other dialogue partners, and all the king’s horses and all the king’s men, would do well to come with their glue and adhesives and participate in this effort.
At stake is much more than the few sentences that would reflect that ASEAN did discuss and come to agreement on the recent tensions between members states Vietnam and the Philippines on one hand, and the group’s dialogue partner China on the other. Although certainly, one is confounded that the chair could not muster the wisdom and perseverance to forge even a minimalist consensus, perhaps – goes the speculation - because of promises made to a non-member of the ASEAN family.

NEW RESOURCE ON PHILIPPINE FOREIGN RELATIONS

Forging a New Philippine Foreign Policy is a new website launched last February 21, 2012 by the Asian Center, University of the Philippines. We conceptualized the website mainly with the hope of stimulating more dynamic discourses on the present and future directions of the country's international relations, and building ever-expanding constituencies for related analysis and advocacy. The site also serves as a resource databank for users and registered members, who may access news, documents, and research papers, among others. Visitors to my blog will likely find this new resource useful as well. The URL is http://philippinesintheworld.org.

THE SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTES: 
IS THE AQUINO WAY THE "ASEAN WAY”?

http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/Perspective/RSIS0042012.pdf

_________________________________________________________________________________
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, NTU
RSIS Commentaries No. 004/2012 dated 5 January 2012

   
Synopsis
Growing Chinese assertiveness and military  capability have led the Aquino government to adopt tougher rhetoric towards China over the South China Sea disputes. Will the Aquino way bring more results than the “ASEAN Way”?
                                                               
Commentary
THE AQUINO government’s tougher posture towards China with regard to the South China Sea disputes is changing the atmospherics of this long-standing regional security issue. While this shift has presented a new approach to tackling the regional tensions,  observers are watching whether the “Aquino way” will bring more results than the “ASEAN Way” of non-confrontation. Not all ASEAN members are, however, comfortable with the Aquino approach.
 
Manila’s core interest

The Philippines, an archipelago entirely surrounded by water, pursues certain core interests in its territorial claims in the South China Sea just like other claimant countries. These include promoting respect for its territorial integrity and sovereignty, security against external threats, access to ocean resources to serve development needs, and maintaining good order at sea. Manila has demonstrated sovereignty over its claimed Kalayaan Islands through continuous occupation of certain features, prevention of illegal entry or illegal fishing, legislation of baselines, and other measures. In seeking peaceful and norms-based approaches to the disputes, it initiated ASEAN’s 1992 Manila Declaration on the South China Sea, which called on claimants to exercise self-restraint and settle disputes peacefully.

PHILIPPINE INTERESTS AND POSITIONS ON THE SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTES

Remarks at a Forum on the South China Sea

Organized by the Carlos P. Romulo Foundation and 

Institute for Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore

17 October 2011, Manila Polo Club

On this occasion, I wish to focus my remarks not on the legal and technical dimensions of the Philippine claims on the South China Sea, about which there has been much discussion already and for which there are far more capable legal scholars and experts. I will instead focus on what I understand to be Philippine interests in the South China Sea, drawing from my background in the study of politics and international relations; and exploring specifically how the territorial disputes and the maritime jurisdiction questions relate with broader issues such as the future of Chinese power, Sino-American rivalry for influence over East Asia, and the value and efficacy of an ASEAN-centered regional approach to the problems. 

I wish to briefly address three points, based on my continuous observation and research on the subject:

1.     What are the Philippines’ “core interests” in the South China Sea?

2.     What has historically been the Philippine approach to the territorial and maritime jurisdiction disputes?

3.     What are the elements of the emerging Philippine policy toward the South China Sea under the Aquino government, and how do they reflect Philippine interests in the evolving regional context?

AQUINO POLICY ON THE SOUTH CHINA SEA: ARE WE READY FOR TOUGH TIMES AHEAD?

The Philippine Star, October 24, 2011, p. 25

By Aileen San Pablo-Baviera

The territorial disputes and maritime jurisdiction issues in the South China Sea will be a continuing bone of contention between the Philippines and its neighbors, especially China which is the most powerful and determined among them, for many years to come.

Since the 1990s, the Philippines has been pro-active in seeking cooperative, rules-based approaches to managing the disputes, relying on both bilateral as well as multilateral diplomacy. Bilaterally, the Philippines entered into agreements with China and Vietnam in 1995 and 1997 pledging self-restraint and urging cooperation on non-sensitive areas. Many high-level exchanges were held, including among military officials. Even at the height of tensions over Mischief Reef, bilateral trade and people-to-people ties between Beijing and Manila thrived.

Multilaterally, the Philippines also spearheaded the 1992 Manila Declaration by ASEAN states, the negotiation of an ASEAN-China code of conduct (COC) which resulted in the 2002 Declaration of Conduct (DOC), and even the ill-fated Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking (JMSU) with China and Vietnam which was allowed to lapse after being implicated in alleged corrupt and treasonous activities of the previous regime.

CAN AND WILL REGIONAL ARCHITECTURE PRODUCE NORMS TO HELP RESOLVE DISPUTES AMONG MEMBER STATES?

Based on Remarks at the Asia Foundation’s Asia Perspectives Program on

“The Evolving Nature of Asia’s Regional Architecture: Views from ASEAN”, 8 November 2011, 9:00-11:00 a.m., Washington, D.C.

[The views expressed are the author's own and do not represent those of the sponsoring organization]

CAN AND WILL REGIONAL ARCHITECTURE PRODUCE NORMS TO HELP RESOLVE DISPUTES AMONG MEMBER STATES? 

Aileen S.P. Baviera

I assume ‘regional architecture’ here to mean the multiple multilateral cooperation arrangements, using the definition by Nick Bisley in 2007: “a reasonably coherent network of regional organizations, institutions, bilateral and multilateral arrangements, dialogue forums, and other relevant mechanisms that work collectively for regional prosperity, peace, and stability.” In east Asia and the Pacific, some of these are projects involving the building of a regional “community”, ideally one based on a shared identity and a “we-feeling”. ASEAN is clearly moving in that direction, and for ASEAN Plus 3 or APT, a similar aspiration had been expressed in the original vision document prepared by the East Asia Vision Group. Geographic contiguity, shared history and economic interdependence play a big role in infusing ASEAN and APT with a sense of a shared destiny.

AQUINO-HU JINTAO JOINT STATEMENT - FULL TEXT

For reference, I am posting the full text of the Aquino-Hu Jintao Joint Statement:
BEIJING, 1 SEPTEMBER 2011 

1. At the invitation of President Hu Jintao of the People's Republic of China, Philippine President Benigno S. Aquino III is undertaking a State Visit to China from 30 August to 3 September 2011.  From Beijing, President Aquino is proceeding to Shanghai and Fujian. Both sides agreed that this a milestone visit in the development of Philippines-China bilateral relations.