PHILIPPINE INTERESTS AND POSITIONS ON THE SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTES

Remarks at a Forum on the South China Sea

Organized by the Carlos P. Romulo Foundation and 

Institute for Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore

17 October 2011, Manila Polo Club

On this occasion, I wish to focus my remarks not on the legal and technical dimensions of the Philippine claims on the South China Sea, about which there has been much discussion already and for which there are far more capable legal scholars and experts. I will instead focus on what I understand to be Philippine interests in the South China Sea, drawing from my background in the study of politics and international relations; and exploring specifically how the territorial disputes and the maritime jurisdiction questions relate with broader issues such as the future of Chinese power, Sino-American rivalry for influence over East Asia, and the value and efficacy of an ASEAN-centered regional approach to the problems. 

I wish to briefly address three points, based on my continuous observation and research on the subject:

1.     What are the Philippines’ “core interests” in the South China Sea?

2.     What has historically been the Philippine approach to the territorial and maritime jurisdiction disputes?

3.     What are the elements of the emerging Philippine policy toward the South China Sea under the Aquino government, and how do they reflect Philippine interests in the evolving regional context?

AQUINO POLICY ON THE SOUTH CHINA SEA: ARE WE READY FOR TOUGH TIMES AHEAD?

The Philippine Star, October 24, 2011, p. 25

By Aileen San Pablo-Baviera

The territorial disputes and maritime jurisdiction issues in the South China Sea will be a continuing bone of contention between the Philippines and its neighbors, especially China which is the most powerful and determined among them, for many years to come.

Since the 1990s, the Philippines has been pro-active in seeking cooperative, rules-based approaches to managing the disputes, relying on both bilateral as well as multilateral diplomacy. Bilaterally, the Philippines entered into agreements with China and Vietnam in 1995 and 1997 pledging self-restraint and urging cooperation on non-sensitive areas. Many high-level exchanges were held, including among military officials. Even at the height of tensions over Mischief Reef, bilateral trade and people-to-people ties between Beijing and Manila thrived.

Multilaterally, the Philippines also spearheaded the 1992 Manila Declaration by ASEAN states, the negotiation of an ASEAN-China code of conduct (COC) which resulted in the 2002 Declaration of Conduct (DOC), and even the ill-fated Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking (JMSU) with China and Vietnam which was allowed to lapse after being implicated in alleged corrupt and treasonous activities of the previous regime.

CAN AND WILL REGIONAL ARCHITECTURE PRODUCE NORMS TO HELP RESOLVE DISPUTES AMONG MEMBER STATES?

Based on Remarks at the Asia Foundation’s Asia Perspectives Program on

“The Evolving Nature of Asia’s Regional Architecture: Views from ASEAN”, 8 November 2011, 9:00-11:00 a.m., Washington, D.C.

[The views expressed are the author's own and do not represent those of the sponsoring organization]

CAN AND WILL REGIONAL ARCHITECTURE PRODUCE NORMS TO HELP RESOLVE DISPUTES AMONG MEMBER STATES? 

Aileen S.P. Baviera

I assume ‘regional architecture’ here to mean the multiple multilateral cooperation arrangements, using the definition by Nick Bisley in 2007: “a reasonably coherent network of regional organizations, institutions, bilateral and multilateral arrangements, dialogue forums, and other relevant mechanisms that work collectively for regional prosperity, peace, and stability.” In east Asia and the Pacific, some of these are projects involving the building of a regional “community”, ideally one based on a shared identity and a “we-feeling”. ASEAN is clearly moving in that direction, and for ASEAN Plus 3 or APT, a similar aspiration had been expressed in the original vision document prepared by the East Asia Vision Group. Geographic contiguity, shared history and economic interdependence play a big role in infusing ASEAN and APT with a sense of a shared destiny.

AQUINO-HU JINTAO JOINT STATEMENT - FULL TEXT

For reference, I am posting the full text of the Aquino-Hu Jintao Joint Statement:
BEIJING, 1 SEPTEMBER 2011 

1. At the invitation of President Hu Jintao of the People's Republic of China, Philippine President Benigno S. Aquino III is undertaking a State Visit to China from 30 August to 3 September 2011.  From Beijing, President Aquino is proceeding to Shanghai and Fujian. Both sides agreed that this a milestone visit in the development of Philippines-China bilateral relations. 

CONTROLLING THE SEAS IN EAST ASIA?

Policy Background Paper no. 3
Published by Australian National University and the 
MacArthur Foundation Asia Security Initiative

INTRODUCTION

THERE IS some debate about whether multilateralism or bilateralism (including US military alliances) provides more effective approaches to security dilemmas facing East Asia. One might apply this question to the maritime security challenges in the region.

At least four interlocking layers of potential maritime conflict exist in East Asia today. These include: (1) territorial and sovereignty disputes over islands and atolls in the East and South China Seas; (2) disputes over undefined or overlapping maritime boundaries and legal jurisdiction issues; (3) threats to maritime safety and sea-lane security; and (4) military competition for sea control among major powers.

Most worrisome is the challenge of great power military competition. Combined, China’s increasing naval power, the vigorous interest of the US in asserting naval primacy, and the growing assertiveness of Japan pose serious challenges to the future security architecture of the Asia-Pacific. In particular, they threaten to undermine the cooperative security institutions and norms that have been painstakingly developed since the end of the Cold War. However, the most urgent security concerns relate to conflicting territorial claims among regional states.

CLAIMANT STATES’ APPROACHES TO MARITIME DISPUTES

To what extent have bilateral and multilateral approaches involving various claimant states succeeded or failed thus far in mitigating the region’s maritime conflicts? Bilateral–multilateral questions are especially relevant to the Spratlys disputes: China has become more adamant that these be resolved bilaterally whereas the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has pressed for a multilateral process. SinoVietnamese tensions, for example, have increased significantly, with China blocking Vietnam’s exploration activities and Vietnam seeking to “internationalize” the dispute.

In terms of the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute, multiple rounds of bilateral negotiations on demarcating the maritime boundaries have led not to delimitation but to a “principled consensus” where Japan and China have agreed to cooperate in a “transitional period.” There had been indications of both governments trying to downplay tensions but in September 2010, ill feelings escalated following the collision between a Chinese trawler and Japanese Coast Guard vessel, leading to large-scale protests.

Read more...
MACARTHUR ASIA SECURITY INITIATIVE Policy Background Paper no. 3

MARITIME SECURITY IN EAST ASIA: IMPACT OF RISING AND DECLINING POWERS

Keynote Address at the International Graduate Students Conference on "Asian Security"

Asian Center, University of the Philippines

13 August 2011

Introduction: Asian Security 30 years ago

The Asian Center is my alma mater and even now, my mother unit, where I continue to teach and which serves as my base for the research that I do. It was in Romulo Hall where I first developed a deep fascination with Asia, and a keen interest in the study of northeast Asia, and then eventually of China and things Chinese. That was over thirty years ago. I recall that as a young graduate student starting my Master of Arts in Asian Studies program in 1980, Japan was the most prosperous country in the region and it enjoyed much economic and cultural influence in the Philippines. It still does. Japan was a leader exercising soft power, back in the days when the concept of soft power had not yet been invented. China was then barely out of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution; it was in the earliest stages of economic reform and opening up, with much of the country and its people still described as 'poor and backward'. Korea was the strange and unfamiliar Hermit Kingdom, with minimal links to the Philippines and Southeast Asia.

Southeast Asia itself was a region greatly preoccupied with conflict, with Vietnam occupying Cambodia and other kinds of social and political problems taking place within the various states. ASEAN referred to five rather than ten countries, and was functioning still as an institution intended to prevent its own members from engaging each other in armed confrontation. India was oblivious to the world beyond South Asia and beyond China, and the world was oblivious to India back then. The conflicts in the Middle East raged, with Israel invading Lebanon in 1982, and the Philippines paid attention because of the implications on conflict in Mindanao, but did not have to worry then about the repatriation of hundreds of thousands of OFWs, who had yet to discover the jobs that lay waiting there.

FILIPINO DOMESTIC HELPERS IN HONG KONG TO BECOME PERMANENT RESIDENTS??

Filipino domestic workers in Hong Kong are a well-organized and outspoken group, numbering well over 100,000.  So well-organized that they have inspired and assisted workers from other Asian countries to follow in their footsteps in seeking better working conditions in the former colony. So outspoken and effective that they became the envy and even the model for some in the Hong Kong women’s movement and democracy circles, in a society where even under British colonial administration (up until 1997), independent and voluntary organizations – hallmarks of democracy and an active civil society  - were not too well-known.

But the relationship of Filipino domestic workers with Hong Kong society is one recently fraught with ups and downs. Domestic helpers took some heat from the Hong Kong public following the bungled hostage crisis at the Quirino Grandstand last August 2010, in which eight Hong Kong tourists were killed.  Every now and then, there are outcries over proposals to increase the minimum wage for foreign domestic helpers, which falls far below the minimum wage for all other groups.

P-NOY ON THE SOUTH CHINA SEA

Philippine President Benigno Simeon Aquino III just gave his first State of the Nation Address (SONA). The address was in Filipino. 


In rough translation, referring to the brewing maritime disputes with China early in his remarks, he said "What belongs to the Philippines belongs to the Philippines...If someone steps on Recto (Reed) Bank, he might as well have stepped on Recto Avenue" (Recto Avenue is a main thoroughfare in downtown Manila) Also, he said that "we're not looking to escalate tensions, but we are ready to defend what is ours," and that "taking the problem to ITLOS (International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea) will better ensure calm and self-restraint." 
[For an official translation of the SONA, see: http://www.gmanews.tv/story/227350/nation/president-aquinos-state-of-the-nation-address-2011]

WHITHER PHILIPPINES-CHINA RELATIONS UNDER PRESIDENT NOYNOY AQUINO?

Re-posting here. This originally came out in Bong Mendoza's Blog, April 20, 2011
Philippines-China relations must be at one of its lowest points ever. Even during the height of the Mischief Reef crisis (1995-1997), economic ties were growing and there was minimal effect on warm people-to-people linkages.

Now the value of economic cooperation with China has been questioned due to perceptions that it has been pursued through corrupt practices (e.g. NBN-ZTE, Northrail, Southrail, Transco, etc). People-to-people ties have also been damaged by the Hong Kong hostage crisis and to a lesser extent by Chinese execution of Filipino drug mules. Moreover, the South China Sea territorial dispute remains a flashpoint, with the Chinese side issuing warnings over recent Philippine-sanctioned oil exploration activities by UK-based Forum Energy on the Reed Bank.

TERRITORIAL DISPUTES IN EAST ASIA: PROXIES FOR CHINA-US STRATEGIC COMPETITION?

Economics, Politics and Public Policy in East Asia and the Pacific
Aileen S.P. Baviera, University of the Philippines


November 27th, 2010
Recent tiffs between China and Japan, China and Vietnam and China and the US concerning the status of disputed islands and waters in the South and the East China seas possess a significance quite distinct from disagreements of the past. More specifically, previous contests amongst coastal states for sovereignty, fisheries, energy resources and maritime navigational rights continue to exist, but they are now being overshadowed by the rivalry among major powers in pursuit of the broader goal of establishing, and expanding, strategic influence.

POWER ASYMMETRY IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA

Philippine Daily Inquirer

12:29 am | Sunday, June 26th, 2011

“China is a big country and other countries are small countries, and that’s just a fact,” China’s Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi said at the 17th Asean Regional Forum in July 2010, after several countries, including the United States,  raised concerns on the South China Sea.

Most reports say the statement was directed at Singapore’s Foreign Minister George Yeo, presumably in response to the city state’s active role in facilitating US military engagement in the region. Others consider it as a message for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean), which has been locked in a stalemate with China over how to manage disputes in the South China Sea, [which Manila now refers to as the West Philippine Sea].

MANILA MUST AVOID SHARP FOREIGN POLICY SWINGS

14 April 2011, Manila Times

News coverage of Philippine foreign policy since the start of President Benigno Aquino 3rd’s administration appears to indicate an emphasis on the invigoration of strategic cooperation with the United States, in contrast to what had been portrayed as policy directions by the Arroyo government to warm up to China at some cost to erstwhile close ties with the United States.

Among the indications of the change in directions was the decision for the President to go to Washington for his first official visit, a departure from past practice where the first visit of the four preceding heads of state (starting with former President Corazon Aquino) was reserved for a neighboring state in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean). Speaking before the Foreign Relations Council just before the Second US-Asean Summit in September

CHINA AND THE SOUTH CHINA SEA: TIME FOR A CODE OF CONDUCT? (RSIS Commentary)

RSIS COMMENTARY No. 91/2011, 14 June 2011

S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies

Synopsis
Recent incidents in the South China Sea point to China’s growing assertiveness and seeming readiness to pressure other countries to recognise its claims. The region urgently needs a Code of Conduct that is specifically designed for the prevention of armed conflict in the disputed areas.